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Abstract—This paper investigates the secrecy outage per-
formance of transmit antenna selection (TAS)/maximal ratio
combining (MRC) in multiple input multiple output (MIMO)
cognitive radio networks (CRNs) over Rayleigh fading channels.
In the considered system, a secondary user (SU-TX) equipped
with NA (NA  1) antennas uses TAS to transmit confidential
messages to another secondary user (SU-RX), which is equipped
with NB (NB  1) antennas and adopts MRC scheme to
process multiple received signals. Meanwhile, an eavesdropper
equipped with NE (NE  1) antennas also adopts MRC scheme
to overhear the transmitted information between SU-TX and
SU-RX. SU-TX adopts the underlay strategy to guarantee the
quality of service of the primary user without spectrum sensing.
In this paper, we derive the exact and asymptotic closed-form
expressions for the secrecy outage probability. Simulations are
conducted to validate the accuracy of the analysis.
Index Terms—Cognitive radio networks, maximal ratio com-
bining, multiple input multiple output, secrecy outage probability,
transmit antenna selection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, as a promising solution to the inadequacy of
spectrum, cognitive radio (CR) has received great attention [1].
In CR, secondary user (SU) can share the spectrum with the
primary user (PU), by using overlay, interweave or underlay
methods in order not to affect the quality of service (QoS)
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of PU. Among them, underlay is easy to realize, as SU only
needs to adjust its transmit power within a threshold that PU
can tolerate [2]. Thus, underlay has been investigated in several
works [3], [4], [5].
On the other hand, due to the broadcast nature of wireless
links, it is difficult to prevent eavesdroppers from overhearing
wireless communications. To address this concern, physical
layer security has been widely considered as an effective
technology to prevent information from being intercepted,
which was first investigated in [6] and recently in [7]-[11].
Security issues play an important role in wireless networks,
especially in cognitive radio networks (CRNs), where the
licensed frequency band is shared among the primary and
secondary users, leading to an increased possibility of eaves-
dropping of the transmitted information for both PU and SU
[12]-[16].
However, very few research has considered the secrecy
performance of multi-antenna diversity, which is one of the
most effective technologies to improve the transmission rate
in CRNs. Refs. [17]-[18] investigated the secrecy outage per-
formance of single input multiple output (SIMO) system using
maximal ratio combining (MRC)/selection combining (SC) in
CRNs. However, Ref. [17] only considered an eavesdropper
with a single antenna. Ref. [18] only considered SC technique.
It is well-known that MRC has better performance than SC.
Motivated by the above observations, in this paper we
analyze the secrecy outage performance of MIMO CRN,
where a secondary user (SU-TX) equipped with NA (NA  1)
antennas uses TAS1 to transmit confidential messages to
another secondary user (SU-RX), which is equipped with NB
(NB  1) antennas and adopts MRC to process multiple
copies of the received signal. Meanwhile, an eavesdropper
(Eve), which is equipped with NE (NE  1) antennas, adopts
MRC for successful eavesdropping. SU-TX adopts underlay
strategy in order not to degrade the QoS of PU. The main
contributions of our work are summarized as follows:
 Compared with [19] and [20] that only considered physi-
cal layer security for a conventional non-CR system, our
paper considers the physical layer security for an underlay
MIMO CRN. Due to the fact that CR system has a
shared frequency band and therefore lower security, such
an analysis of the secrecy performance for CR system
1TAS is a low cost and complexity method for exploiting spatial diversity
in multiple antenna settings [19].
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is important. Our proposed analytical model can bring
out an insight on the secrecy outage performance of SU
systems, which cannot be obtained from [19] and [20]
for non-CR systems.
 Compared with [18] that considered physical layer se-
curity for CR using SC, this work considers physical
layer security for CR using MRC, as MRC can improve
the secrecy performance of the desired user but can also
increase the eavesdropping capability of the eavesdropper.
Thus, it is important to identify the effect of MRC.
 We study the secrecy outage performance of CRNs and
derive accurate and asymptotic closed-form expressions
for secrecy outage probability (SOP). Our asymptotic
results accurately predict the secrecy diversity order and
secrecy diversity gain.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Fig. 1. System model
We consider a MIMO wiretap channel in CRNs, as illus-
trated in Fig. 1. SU-TX is equipped with NA (NA  1) anten-
nas and TAS is used to encode the confidential messages into
transmitted codeword x = [x(1); x(2);    ; x(n)], which is
subject to an average power constraint 1n
Pn
i=1 E
jx(i)j2 
PS . SU-TX transmits x to SU-RX, which is equipped with NB
(NB  1) antennas and adopts MRC to improve its received
SNR, while Eve, which is equipped with NE (NE  1) anten-
nas, also adopts MRC to promote successful eavesdropping.
hP = [hp1; hp2;    ; hpNA ] is the channel vector of the SU-
TX–PU link. HD and HE are the channel gain matrixes of
SU-TX–SU-RX and SU-TX–Eve links, respectively.
We assume that all channels experience independent
Rayleigh fading and additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
with variance of N0. We also assume that the channel state
information (CSI) of SU-TX–PU and SU-TX–SU-RX links
are available at SU-TX, while the CSI of SU-TX–Eve link is
unavailable at SU-TX2. The CSI from PU to SU-TX can be
obtained by using channel reciprocity [5]. For simplification,
we denote hP , hD and hE as the average channel power
gains of SU-TX–PU, SU-TX–SU-RX and SU-TX–Eve links,
respectively.
As the CSI of the SU-TX–Eve link is not available at SU-
TX, making use of the CSI among SU-TX–SU-RX, the “best”
transmit antenna, which can maximize the total received signal
power at SU-RX, is chosen to deliver the information. If such
2In this scenario, SU-TX has no choice but to encode the confidential data
into codewords of a constant rate RS [18].
CSI is available, it would also be interesting to consider the
selection of the worst antenna for the PU and eavesdropper.
This can be a future research topic.
In order not to degrade the QoS of PU, when the uth
(u = 1; 2;    ; NA) antenna of SU-TX is selected to transmit
messages, the transmit power (Pt) at SU-TX should be limited
at a given threshold (IP ) that PU equipped with a single
antenna can tolerate,
Pt =
(
IP =gP ; PS  IP =gP ) gP  IP =PS ;
PS ; PS < IP =gP ) gP < IP =PS ;
(1)
where gP = jhpuj2 is the channel power gain between the uth
antenna of SU-TX and PU, PS is the maximum transmitting
power available at SU-TX.
The received signal vectors of SU-RX and Eve from the uth
transmit antenna at time t are
yD(t) =
p
PthDux(t) + nD; (2)
yE(t) =
p
PthEux(t) + nE ; (3)
where hDu, hEu are the channel vectors between the uth
transmit antenna and SU-RX, Eve whose elements are in-
dependent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) under Rayleigh
fading, and nD, nE are the AWGN vectors at SU-TX and Eve,
respectively. This is a reasonable assumption as the channels
among SU-TX and each antenna at a terminal, like SU-RX or
EVE, are close to each other.
Let P = 1=hP , D = 1=hD and E = 1=hE . When the
uth antenna of SU-TX is selected to transmit information, the
probability density functions of the MRC-combined channel
power gain of SU-RX and Eve are given by [4]
fgDu (gDu) =
gNB 1Du exp ( DgDu)NBD
(NB   1)! ; gDu  0; (4)
fgEu (gEu) =
gNE 1Eu exp ( EgEu)NEE
(NE   1)! ; gEu  0; (5)
where gDu = khDuk2 and gEu = khEuk2, in which k  k
denotes the Euclidean norm, respectively.
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Preliminaries
The TAS/MRC-combined channel power gain (gD) of SU-
RX can be given by
gD = max
u=1;2;::;NA
fgDug : (6)
According to Ref. [19], the probability density function
(PDF) of gD can be derived as
fgD (x) = NA[FgDu (x)]
NA 1fgDu (x)
=
NA
NB
D
(NB   1)!
NA 1X
l=0
 
NA   1
l
!
( 1)l
 exp [ D (l + 1)x]
 
NB 1X
i=0
iDx
i
i!
!l
xNB 1;
(7)
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where FgDu() is the cumulative probability density function
(CDF) of gDu given by
FgDu(x) = 1  exp( Dx)
NB 1X
i=0
iDx
i
i!
: (8)
Using Eq. (9) in [21], we can have
fgD (x) =
NA
NB
D
(NB   1)!
NA 1X
l=0
 
NA   1
l
!
( 1)l
n0X
n1=0
n1X
n2=0
  
nR 2X
nR 1=0
"
R 1Y
i=1
 
ni 1
ni
!
1
i!
ni ni+1
niD
#
 xM exp [ D (l + 1)x] ; (9)
where M = N + NB   1, N = n1 + n2 +    + nR 1,
R = NB , n0 = l and nR = 0. When R = 1 and N = 0,
R 1P
i=0
(Dx)
i 1
i!
n0
= 1.
As the transmit antenna index is optimum for the SU-
TX–SU-RX link, Eve is not able to exploit any additional
diversity from the multiple transmit antennas at SU-TX. Thus,
the PDF of the combined channel power (gE) at Eve is given
by fgE (x) = fgEu(x).
The instantaneous secrecy capacity is given by
CS =
(
log2

1 + Pt
gD
N0

  log2

1 + Pt
gE
N0

; gD > gE ;
0; gD  gE :
(10)
SOP is defined as the probability that the instantaneous
secrecy capacity is below a target secrecy rate (Cth, Cth  0).
Different from [18], we can calculate SOP under the two cases
of Pt suggested by (1) as
SOP (Cth) =Pr fgP  IP /PSgSOP1 (Cth)
+ Pr fgP < IP /PSgSOP2 (Cth) ; (11)
where SOP1 (Cth) and SOP2 (Cth) refer to the SOP when
Pt = IP =gP and Pt = PS , respectively.
As gP = jhpuj2  exp (1=hP ), the items
Pr fgP  IP =PSg and Pr fgP  IP =PSg in (11) can
be easily obtained as
Pr fgP  IP =PSg = exp

 P IP
PS

(12)
Pr fgP  IP =PSg = 1  exp

 P IP
PS

; (13)
respectively. Next, we derive SOP1(Cth) and SOP2(Cth) to
calculate the overall SOP in (11).
B. The derivation of SOP1 (Cth)
When Pt = IP =gP , we can write SOP1(Cth) as [12]
Pr fCS  Cthg = Pr

  1

gP  gD   gE

; (14)
where  = 2Cth and  = IP =N0.
Let Z1 =  1 gP , Z2 = gD   gE and X = gE . The
PDFs of X and Z1 can be derived as3
fX (x) =
xNE 1 exp ( Ex=)NEE
NE (NE   1)! (15)
fZ1 (z1) =
AP
  1 exp

 P z1
  1

; z1  (  1)N0
PS
= B;
(16)
respectively, where A = 1= exp ( P IP =PS).
Using Eq. (6-55) in [22], when Z2  0, we can write the
PDF of Z2 as4
fZ2 (z2) =
Z 1
0
fgD (z2 + x) fX (x) dx: (17)
Substituting the PDFs of gD and X into (17) and after some
mathematical manipulations, we can derive fZ2(z2) as (18),
as shown on the top of next page.
We can rewrite (14) as
SOP1 (Cth) =
Z 1
B
fZ1 (z1)
Z 0
 1
fZ2 (z2) dz2dz1| {z }
I1
+
Z 1
B
fZ1 (z1)
Z z1
0
fZ2 (z2) dz2dz1| {z }
I2
: (19)
To facilitate the following analysis, we define an integral,
I3, as follows
I3 =
Z 1
0
fZ2 (z2) dz2: (20)
I3 can be easily calculated as (21), as shown on the top of
next page. Therefore, it is easy to observe that
I1 =
Z 1
B
fZ1(z1)  (1  I3) dz1 = 1  I3: (22)
We can rewrite I2 as (23), as shown on the top of next page,
where (n; x) =
R x
0
exp( t)tn 1dt is the lower incomplete
gamma function [23].
Using Eq. (8.352.1) in [23] to expand (:; :) in I4 into the
form of series , the integral in (23) can be derived as (24), as
shown on the next page, where  = D (l + 1) + P 1 and
 (n; x) =
R1
x
exp( t)tn 1dt is the upper incomplete gamma
function [23].
Finally, we can derive SOP1 (Cth) as
SOP1 (Cth) = 1  I3 +
X


MX
k=0
I4; (25)
where I4 is given in (24), 
 is given in (18) and  is given
in (23).
3In this case, gP  IP =PS . The PDF of gP can be obtained by fgP (x) =
AP exp( P x).
4To simplify the analysis, we need not calculate the PDF of Z2 < 0,
directly.
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fZ2 (z2) =
NA
NB
D 
NE
E
NE (NE   1)! (NB   1)!
NA 1X
l=0
 
NA   1
l
!
( 1)l
n0X
n1=0
n1X
n2=0
  
nR 2X
nR 1=0
"
R 1Y
i=1
 
ni 1
ni
!
1
i!
ni ni+1
niD
#
| {z }



MX
k=0
 
M
k
!
  (NE + k)

E

+ D (l + 1)
 (NE+k)
zM k2 exp ( D (l + 1) z2): (18)
I3 =
X


MX
k=0
 
M
k
!
  (NE + k)

E

+ D (l + 1)
 (NE+k)
  (M   k + 1) [D (l + 1)] (M k+1): (21)
I2 =
X


MX
k=0
 
M
k
!
  (NE + k)

E

+ D (l + 1)
 (NE+k)
[D (l + 1)]
 (M k+1)AP
  1| {z }


Z 1
B
exp

 P z1
  1

(M   k + 1; D (l + 1) z1) dz1| {z }
I4
: (23)
I4 = (M   k)!
(
  1
P
exp

 PB
  1

 
M kX
m=0
[D (l + 1)]
m
m!
  (m+ 1;B)
m+1
)
: (24)
SOP2 (Cth) =1  1
  (NE)
NAX
p=1
 
NA
p
!
( 1)p 1 exp

 p (  1)
B
NB 1Y
u=1
"
iu 1X
iu=0
 
iu 1
iu
!
1
u!
iu iu+1# 1
B
 u


1
E
NE  uX
t=0
 
 u
t
!
t(  1) u t  (t+NE)

p
B
+
1
E
 (t+NE)
: (26)
C. The derivation of SOP2 (Cth)
When gP < IP =PS , Pt = PS . It means that SU-TX only
adopts its maximum transmitting power to deliver information
to SU-RX. Obviously, the target system model becomes a non-
CR model in this case.
Substituting B = PSgD=N0, B = PShM=N0, E =
PSgE=N0 and E = PShE=N0 into Eq. (25) in [20], where
mB = mE = 1
5, we can calculate SOP2 (Cth) as (26), as
shown on the top of next page, where  u =
NB 1P
u=1
iu, i0 = p
and iNE = 0.
Finally, SOP can be obtained by substituting (12), (13), (25)
and (26) into (11).
IV. ASYMPTOTIC SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
In this section, we will present the asymptotic SOP analysis
when D ! 0, namely 1 = PSN0D ! 1 in [18], motivated
5The closed-form expression for SOP in [20] was derived in Nakagami-m
fading scenarios. Then, we can easily obtain the closed-form expression for
SOP over Rayleigh fading channels by substituting mB = mE = 1 into Eq.
(25) in [20].
by the fact that the secrecy diversity order and secrecy array
gain govern the SOP at high SNR at SU-RX. Another aim of
deriving asymptotic SOP is that the asymptotic expression is
normally more concise than that of the exact expression.
A. The Derivation of Asymptotic SOP11
When D ! 0, by applying binomial combination and first
order Maclaurin series expansion and then keeping the first
two terms in the Maclaurin series expansion, we can rewrite
(7) as
fgD (x) =
NA
NANB
D
(NB   1)!(NB !)NA 1
xNANB 1 + o

NANBD

;
(27)
where o() denotes higher order terms.
In order to derive the asymptotic analysis, (14) can be
rewritten as
SOP1 = Pr

  1

gP + gE  gD

: (28)
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Let Z3 =  1 gP + gE and a =
E
   P 1 . Using Eq.
(1.111) in [23], we can derive the PDF of Z3 as
fZ3 (z3) =
AP
NE
E
(  1)NE (NE   1)!
NE 1X
q=0
 
NE   1
q
!
( 1)NE q 1 [Q1 (NE   q   1; a; z3) Q1 (NE   q   1; a; B)]
_zq3 exp

 E

z3

; (29)
where Q1(; ; ) is defined as (given by Eq. (1.3.2.6) in [24])
Q1 (n; a; x) =
Z
xn exp (ax) dx = exp (ax)

"
xn
a
+
nX
p=1
( 1)pn (n  1)    (n  p+ 1)
ap+1
xn p
#
:
(30)
When D ! 0, using (27), we can write the asymptotic
SOP1 as
SOP11 =
Z 1
B
fZ3 (z3)
Z z3
0
fgD (gD)dgDdz3
=
NANBD
(NB !)
NA
Z 1
B
fZ3 (z3) z
NANB
3 dz3 + o

NANBD

: (31)
Substituting the PDF of Z3 into the above equation and
using the closed-form expression of Q2 given in Appendix,
we can derive the closed-form expression of the asymptotic
SOP11 as
SOP11 = (Ga1  D)NANB + o

NANBD

; (32)
where the achieved secrecy array gain is G 1a1 where Ga1 is
defined as (33), as shown on the top of next page, in which
 =
AP
NE
E
( 1)NE (NE 1)!(NB !)NA .
B. The Derivation of Asymptotic SOP12
When gP < IP =PS , the target system model becomes non-
CR model in this case. Thus, considering Eqs. (26) and (27)
in [20], we can obtain the closed-form expression for SOP12
SOP12 = (Ga2  D)NANB + o

NANBD

; (34)
where Ga2 is defined as
Ga2 =
"
(  1)NANB
(NB !)
NA  (NE)
NANBX
p=0
 
NANB
p
!

PS
(  1)EN0
p
  (NE + p)
 1
NANB N0
PS
: (35)
Finally, we can derive the closed-form expression of the
asymptotic SOP as
SOP1 = (Ga  D)NANB + o

NANBD

; (36)
where the achieved secrecy diversity gain is NANB , and G 1a
determines the slope of the asymptotic outage probability
curve, which is derived as
Ga =

GNANBa1  exp

 P IP
PS

+GNANBa2 

1  exp

 P IP
PS
 1
NANB
: (37)
Note that the SOP expressions derived in the previous section
allow for the direct determination of the effects of all the
important system parameters on the secrecy performance. This
eliminates the need for tedious simulations to exhaust all
possible values of the system parameters and therefor is useful.
Moreover, the asymptotic results in (32) and (36) are only
polynomial functions, the simplest possible form, to give the
direct insights on the effects of diversity gain and diversity
slope. They all represent important contributions.
V. NUMERICAL AND SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we run Monte Carlo simulation to validate
our analytical expressions of the SOP over Rayleigh fading
channels. In each simulation case, SU-TX sends 106 bits to
SU-RX.
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Fig. 2. SOP versus IP for PS = 1 dB, P = 2, D = 2, E = 4,
Cth = 0:1 bit/s/Hz, NA = 2, NB = 4 and N0 = 1.
In order to present the increasing secrecy diversity of using
TAS at SU-TX, Fig. 2 shows the SOP of TAS/MRC in MIMO
wiretap system, compared with the SOP of MRC in SIMO
wiretap system, namely NA = 1, versus IP for various NE
over Rayleigh fading channels in CRNs. It is shown that
SOP increases with increasing NE , as the MRC diversity
gain increases at Eve. It is evident that for a fixed NE , SOP
decreases with increasing IP , which increases peak transmit
power at PU and this increases the transmitting power at SU-
TX. We can also see that, there exists a floor for SOP in the
high IP region. It is because Pt = PS when IP !1, which
means that in this case the transmitting SNR remains constant.
Moreover, it can also be seen that the secrecy performance of
TAS/MRC scheme greatly outperforms the one of the MRC
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Ga1 =
(

NE 1X
q=0
 
NE   1
q
!
( 1)NE q 1
"
Q2  Q1 (NE   q   1; a; B)  

NANB + q + 1;
E

B


E
NANB+q+1#) 1NANB
:
(33)
scheme, because the secrecy diversity order of TAS/MRC is
NANB , while the secrecy diversity order of MRC is NB .
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Fig. 3. SOP versus ! = 1=D for PS = 3 dB, IP = 1 dB, P = 2,
Cth = 1 bit/s/Hz, NE = 2 and N0 = 1.
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Fig. 4. SOP versus ! = 1=D for PS = 3 dB, IP = 1 dB, P = 3,
Cth = 0:1 bit/s/Hz, NA = 1 and N0 = 1.
Figs. 3 and 4 show the SOP versus ! = 1=D. In Fig. 3,
SOP decreases with increasing NA. This can be explained by
the fact that NA increases the transmitting diversity at SU-
TX. The diversity gain of MRC at SU-RX can be improved
as NB increases. This offers an explanation of why SOP
declines while NB rising. It is also worth noting that the
secrecy diversity order for (NA; NB) = (3; 4) is the highest,
at NANB = 12, followed by the ones for (NA; NB) = (3; 3),
while the secrecy diversity order for (NA; NB) = (2; 3)
is the lowest, at 6, which means that the secrecy outage
performance of (NA; NB) = (3; 4) is the best among the three
(NA; NB) combinations. Moreover, the obtained asymptotic
results match very well with the exact results, and accurately
predict the secrecy diversity order and secrecy array gain in the
high ! region, namely, in the high 1 region in [18]. Further,
we can also observe that the asymptotic SOP presents the
upper bound of the exact SOP.
Due to the fact that the secrecy performance of SC scheme
in CRNs was only considered in [18], while the secrecy
performance of MRC scheme has not yet been investigated
in the previous works6, Fig. 4 compares the secrecy outage
performance between MRC and SC schemes, namely,NA = 1.
Obviously, apart from the scenario of (NB ; NE) = (3; 6), the
secrecy outage performance of MRC outperforms the one of
SC among the other three scenarios, (NB ; NE) = (3; 3); (6; 6)
and (6; 3), respectively, although the secrecy diversity orders
of MRC and SC schemes are same.
Further, simulation and analytical results match very well
with each other, which verify our proposed analytical models.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the physical layer security in
MIMO cognitive wiretap channels and investigated the secrecy
outage performance over Rayleigh fading channels by deriving
closed-form expressions for the exact and asymptotic SOP.
VII. APPENDIX
We consider the following integral equation
Q2 =
1Z
B
Q1 (NE   q   1; a; z3)  zNANB+q3 exp

 E

z3

dz3:
(38)
Substituting Q1(; ; ) into the above equation and using Eq.
(3.351.2) in [23], we can derive Q2 as
Q2 =
1
a

  1
P
NE+NANB
 

NE +NANB ;
P
  1B

+
NE q 1X
p=1
( 1)p (NE   q   1) (NE   q   2)    (NE   q   p)
ap+1


  1
P
NE+NANB p
 

NE +NANB   p; P
  1B

:
(39)
6Ref. [17] has only considered that Eve is equipped with a single antenna
and the transmit power restriction at SU-TX is incomplete, so the contribution
of [17] is significantly limited.
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